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A Proposed Code Provision on
Tort Liability
James Barclay Smith*
It is accepted history that in ancient, primitive times the gov-
ernment and its administration were so simple that, in addition
to his other duties, the King exercised the judicial power out of
hand. Eventually, this function of government was delegated to
courts where private parties were permitted to seek redress for
their injuries. From whatever reasons, the function bloomed into
the Anglo-American system-flowered by the rules of common
law pleading. Great was the good; and the glory thereof is 'said
to be the purpose simply to seek the truth. The litigant sought
the truth-the duty of government was to provide the machinery
to disclose it. Rules developed rules, and rules developed inter-
pretations until their art was the master of its creators. Bentham
and Maitland, Edward Livingston and David Dudley Field land-
marked efforts to control litigation to the end that rights could
be fairly, simply, and finally declared without needless delay.
However, the progression to complexity seems to be congenital in
every system. By the same token, government has the continu-
ing obligation to reinventory the whole to assure adherence to
the stated principle. It is elementary in human experience that
the rank and file are impressed by the first index of government,
the manner in which its mandates, methods and officers touch
them. Realism in contact colors theory of perspective.
The phenomenon of complexity of government confounds
everyone. The eternal question arises: Is it necessary? In the
overall, as the business of government increases, the answer must
be in the affirmative as to the trend. But in the particular, as we
learn more of method and have confidence in our institutions, the
answer can and must be in the negative.
Our purpose here is to establish simple standards to achieve
just results in measuring the consequences of negligent injury
to others. Many years of study to this end have led to the con-
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clusions expressed in the appendix hereto. They are presented
for legislative enactment.
Fair-minded decent men, considerate of their fellows, proba-
bly would come to a just reparation agreement among them-
selves. With them, the injuries are truly accidental. But those
whose conduct is negligent, either habitually or occasionally,
those who disregard the rights of others, are not such men. They
embrace the toils of the law to exploit as they destroyed. And their
less numerous brothers are caught by the necessity of survival
and self defense in an adversary proceeding from which they can-
not escape. Every relationship requires the protecting hand of
the impartial moderator, the representative government of all,
expressing itself through the courts in just and simple rules of
substantive and procedural law. From one end of the bookshelf
of the centuries to the other, in every mature system of juris-
prudence, there is only one rule of substantive law in torts-he
who injures another must make the injured party whole. It
must follow that the standard, demanded by experience, of rules
of procedure is a rule which permits the statement of the evi-
dence of negligence and of the consequences of negligence to be
stated to those (the jury and the judge) who must equate the
equities of the parties.
Complexity is an inescapable evolution of practice under
rules of procedure. It is true that the courts are an armor of pro-
tection both defensively and offensively. But it is also true that
the public policy is against litigation. It was articulated by pro-
scribing champerty and maintenance. They have analogy in the
rule against multifariousness.
Once the litigants are in court, public policy constantly has
been seeking rules to dilute and lessen the distortion of justice-
defeating technicalities of pleading-and proof. Here come troop-
ing the rules of set-off, of counterclaim, and of joinder. Rallied
with them are interpleader, intervention, and the bringing in of
third parties and alternative pleading. Great advances were re-
corded in the Livingston code and in that of Field, which gradu-
ally spread across the states. The federal conformity rule was
supposed to make local process single. More recent are the new
civil practice act in New York and the New Jersey moderniza-
tion. Great advance was made in the new federal rules of civil
procedure, even if conformity was lost.
After this recital, a little glossing must convince any intelli-
gent layman that he may just tell the story of the negligent
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injury to an intelligent officer and have an end to it. But here he
really meets the "law." He did not plead, or hl did not cross-
plead, or he did not say he was not negligent, or he did not say
the other fellow was negligent, or that such negligence con-
tributed to the result. All the time he only asks the judge-
"Don't you understand me?"; and he gets the answer, "Yes, I
understand you, but you did not use the magic form and sequence
of tag and touch. The rules! The rules! You have not played the
game according to the rules." To all this the good man answers
simply, "I am playing no game. I want only peace." But that
would bring him out in accord with the fundamental public
policy. And all of these niceties of sequence and recital have
their concomitant, burden of proof.'
Smug in the equipment of his art, the lawyer held to his
technical rules. Aside from the disrepute or contempt which
attached to the courts and to the lawyer in the popular mind,
relief had to be had. The business man turned to arbitration. For
a long time he was stymied by the courts' saying he was ousting
them of their jurisdiction. Finally, the popular demand and
usage seem to have given virtue to the practice. But the legis-
latures, confronted by a shaking and complex economy, found
that results had to be reached in time to be useful, and the courts'
"rules" just would not permit this. It was not an incapacity with-
in the judicial power that caused the business of the courts to go
to the administrative tribunal; 2 but there it is, and what indig-
nation it causes at the bar!3
The maximum achievement in procedure seems reflected in
the theory of the equity accounting. The proposed rules of de-
lictual liability expressed in the appendix are designed to make
each party account for his negligence and let the trier of fact
equate them upon all of the relevant evidence of fault, free of
tricks of pleading and proof. There is no need to project a new
cycle of interpretations and of rules resulting from legislation
denominated Comparative Negligence, as has happened in some
of our states and in the provinces of Canada. No matter how
many rules of pleading and proof are carried in an instruction,
the average juror, seeking a just result, will ask himself how
much the favored pleader hurt the other party, before he affixes
damages. When the balance of the account is struck, the uni-
1. Moreau v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 F. (2d) 543 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1948).
2. Smith, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Canon (1941) 28 Va. L. Rev.
129, at n. 122.
3. See remarks of Reed (1937) 62 A.B.A. Rep. 89.
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versal rule of tort responsibility will have been served. Injury
will have been made whole through damages. The proposed rule
of pleading and procedure will make admissible all relevant evi-
dance of related, negligent injury. An accounting is not barred
because a party other than the defendant has committed a breach
of duty. Adjustment to a balance is the purpose of the proceed-
ing. When, as is so commonly true, one of the litigants in tort
actions is wholly without fault, it seems nonsense to abort a
prayer for relief because a plaintiff may have contributed a little'
to the cause of injury. Livingston's test of a code, namely, that
ordinary men may understand it readily and be convinced of the
justness of its purpose, still seems the sense of a code of justice.
APPENDIX
Delictual Liability
(Consequences of Negligence)
Measure of Fault. When the negligence of both the plain-
tiff and the defendant are concurring proximate causes of
injury, the damage shall be apportioned as the equities of
the case require. If the negligence of only one of the
parties is the sole proximate cause of the injury, that party
shall bear the whole burden of reparation as the equities of
the case may appear. If, notwithstanding the negligence of
one, the other party by the exercise of ordinary care and
caution could have avoided the effects of that negligence, the
negligence of the latter in failing to do so is the sole proxi-
mate cause. An allegation of negligence by any party will
permit evidence of negligence of all and make operative the
rules of this section.
Measure of Damages. Compensation will be calculated
with recognition of the duty of the injured party to minimize
damages; and, if property be damaged, he is entitled only to
an amount of money necessary to spend in repair of the prop-
erty so as not to leave it essentially depreciated in present
market value or inferior in practical use, not to an amount
necessary to restore it to the identical condition it was in
before the injury.
The foregoing appendix is submitted for discussion and
integration into legislation. The need for legislation seems clear.
I believe the form suggested is a proper one.
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